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SUMMARY 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the competitiveness of 
contract bids entered by individual bidders through the variables of 
bidder size, contract value and project type.   The analysis indicates 
that, in terms of competitiveness, there is a relationship between the 
size of bidder and size of contract.  This concurs with previous work 
in the field.  Bidders having competitiveness affinities towards 
particular types of projects, although apparent, appear to be weaker 
for the private sector than found in previous work concerning the 
public sector. 
 
Key words: Bidding performance, competitive bidding, bid variability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A major aspect in the use of selective competitive tendering (bidding) 
is the prequalification (selection) of suitable bidders to enter the 
auction.  This is often accomplished by crude subjective assessment of 
bidders' capabilities based on the prequalifier's first or second hand 
knowledge of the bidders.  Russell et al (1990) describe the process 
as an art, where subjective judgment based on an individual's 
experience is an essential part of the process.  Such a procedure is 
naturally rather unreliable and may result in the selection of bidders 
that are either not interested or not able to provide competitive bids 
for a contract.  There is also the possibility that other ready, 
willing and able potential bidders may be neglected. 
 
In an earlier paper (Skitmore, 1981), one of the authors examined the 
implications of a virtually random prequalification procedure in which 
it was shown that identification of the most competitive bidders was a 
crucial missing factor.  Flanagan and Norman (1982a) suggest that, in 
order to assess competitiveness, the decision maker "... must take 
into account the bidding range and the relationship between the lowest 
and second and third lowest bids".  In a subsequent analysis (Flanagan 
and Norman 1982b) they consider a series of bids from three 
construction contract bidders and conclude that competitiveness is 
affected to some extent by both project type and size, depending on 
the particular bidder concerned. 
 
The work described in this paper was aimed firstly at examining the 
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rationale underlying Flanagan and Norman's approach and then extending 
their original analysis to a closer examination of the exhibited and 
likely competitiveness of bidders in terms of common characteristics 
of both bidders (size) and contracts (size and type) both for 
explanatory and predictive purposes.  Our main contribution in this 
has been in the development of a quadratic form of competitiveness 
index by which it has been possible to generate some new findings in 
addition to testing Flanagan and Norman's assertions.  Concluding 
remarks indicate the potential of the new approach for use by 
practitioners in making more systematic prequalification decisions of 
this kind. 
 
 
COMPETITIVENESS AND BID VARIABILITY 
 
In construction contract auctions, bidders entering consistently low 
value bids are reckoned to be more competitive than those entering 
consistently high value bids.  A well known adage, however, is that 
'the bidder who makes the most mistakes wins the most contracts'.  
Such mistakes may be regarded as random perturbations resulting in 
either unnecessary additions or omissions to bids to produce high and 
low bids respectively.  Bidders most prone to mistakes of this kind 
therefore have a greater competitiveness inconsistency than others and 
in general these bidders have a greater chance of entering the lowest 
(and highest) bid. 
 
Competitive inconsistency is manifested in the variability of bids 
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entered by individual bidders over a series of auctions and have been 
ascribed to many factors other than pure mistake, including: 
 
Cost estimate.   
 
The variability of cost estimates has been attributed to three 
factors; (1) inherent unpredictability (e.g. site performance, weather 
conditions) (2) uncertainty due to incomplete design and future cost 
levels (3) costing errors (Skitmore, 1982).  Also, as bidders only 
have an imperfect knowledge of the direct costs of a building 
contract, bidders allow different contingency values according to 
their perception and attitude to the levels of risk involved. 
 
The variability of cost estimates between bidders is considered by 
several authors (eg., Beeston, 1983) to be the major component of bid 
variability. 
 
Mark up. 
 
Different bidders apply different mark up policies which may be 
variable or fixed.  Upson (1987) suggests that the following factors 
should be given consideration for variable mark up policies: 
 
(1) work in hand  
(2) bids in hand 
(3) availability of staff 
(4) profitability  
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(5) ability of architect or other supervising officer  
(6) contract conditions  
(7) site conditions  
(8) construction methods and programme 
(9) market conditions  
(10) identity of other bidders.   
 
The strategic selection of mark up values has been considered 
extensively in the literature.  Fine (1975) has identified several 
strategies including random bidding when work is low, selective 
bidding and severely competitive bidding with claim back within the 
limits of the contract.  Stone (1983) has also suggested that some 
firms aim at lower standards of work than others and that there are 
differences in efficiency and therefore cost. 
 
 
Serious and non serious bids 
 
The seriousness of bids can be considered in relation to job 
desirability.  For example, the following six decisions are often made 
in ascending order of job desirability, ie. 
 
(1) decline to bid 
(2) return tender documents 
(3) submit cover price 
(4) produce rough estimate and add mark up 
(5) produce detailed estimate and add mark up 
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(6) add 'non price' features 
 
Only bids derived from at least (5) are usually considered to be 
genuine and serious.   As detailed estimates are most likely to be 
less variable, even between bidders, we can be reasonably confident 
that serious bids will have a lower variablility than non serious 
bids.   
 
Collusion with other bidders. 
 
The little evidence that is available suggests this to be rare 
occurrence in construction auctions, generally restricted to highly 
specialised work where the bidders virtually monopolise the field 
(Skitmore, 1986). 
 
Effect of subcontracting. 
 
Flanagan and Norman (1985) state that this is a source of bid 
variability simply because main contractors employ different 
subcontractors and split the contract into various subcontracted work 
packages for different contracts. 
 
Variety of bidders involved. 
 
The smaller the contract the greater the potential number of bidders 
able to undertake the work.  Therefore there is less chance the same 
bidders are included on the bid list. 
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Perceived 'norms' 
 
Just as some contractors display a greater bidding inconsistency, 
others may be more consistent in their bidding which on occasion may 
manifest itself in a small range of bids being received for certain 
projects.  This small range may be indicative of collusion between the 
bidders or due to the existance of a perceived 'norm'. 
 
A genuine bid may be interpreted as a reflection of the perceived 
'norm' - that is what contractors think the market price is for a 
particular contract at a certain point in time.   Thus a bid is 
essentially an estimate of the (unknown) market price.  In this sense, 
the consistency between bidders is an indication of the degree of 
consensus concerning the value of the market price which, in turn, is 
influenced by such factors as the predictability of the market price 
and the experience of the bidders. 
 
 
SELECTION OF BIDDERS 
 
In the selection of bidders, Russell et al (1990) propose a decision 
model for prequalification consisting of :- 
 
(1) preliminary screening criteria (eg., references, reputation, past 
performance) 
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(2) contractor resources (eg., financial stability, status of current work 
programme, technical expertise) 
 
(3) other items (eg., project-specific criteria). 
 
More specifically they suggest that the following factors should be 
considered:- 
 
(1) length of time in business and length of time controlled by current 
management 
 
(2) types of project performed in the past 
 
(3) largest projects performed within last 10 years and last 5 years 
 
(4) amount of current uncompleted work in hand and largest amount of uncompleted 
work in hand (past three years or highest historical value) 
 
(5) bond decision and bond cost. 
 
One of the main objectives in prequalification of potential bidders is 
to ensure a reasonable level of competitiveness for the work in hand. 
 This presents little difficulty with efficient and consistently low 
bidders.  Inconsistent bidders are more of a problem.  If the 
inconsistency is caused by erratic cost estimating, then low bids may 
well be based on estimates unwittingly made for values below actual 
costs.  Although superficially of little interest to the client, such 
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unrealistic or suicidal bids are potentially terminal for the 
contractor involved resulting in either a proliferation of claims or 
illiquidity.  Either way this spells trouble for the client. 
 
Consultants do to a limited extent have control over this in selective 
tendering as they may determine the number and identity of bidders 
allowed to enter the auction.  Reducing the number of competing 
bidders is one possibility as it lessens the chance of a suicidally 
inconsistent bid winning the contract.  An alternative is to carefully 
construct the bid list to avoid possible problems by including only 
bidders who are sufficiently experienced with estimating costs for the 
work involved. 
 
It would seem that experience is a key factor.  By using feedback from 
previous similar contracts handled, an experienced bidder can be more 
confident of his company's likely actual costs.  As a result it is 
expected that such experienced bidders formulate bid prices on the 
basis of knowledge, relative efficiency and experience rather than 
simply reacting to what competitors are expected to do (Flanagan and 
Norman, 1985) and therefore rather more consistent in their bidding 
than their inexperienced counterparts. 
 
Likely efficiency and consistency can be determined to an extent by 
raising a few key questions such as: 
 
-Has the bidder had recent experience in constructing a project of 
similar size and type? 
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-Is the size of bidder appropriate to the contract value? 
 
-Is the contract value within ranges normally undertaken by the 
bidder? 
 
Answers to these questions can to some extent be obtained through the 
analysis of past bidding performance. 
 
 
MEASURABLE FACTORS AFFECTING BIDDING BEHAVIOUR 
 
Flanagan and Norman (1982a) suggested that bidding behaviour is likely 
to be affected by five major factors, namely: 
 
(1) size and value of contract and construction or managerial complexity to 
complete it  
(2) regional market conditions  
(3) current and projected workload of the bidder 
(4) type of client  
(5) type of project. 
 
 
In a later empirical study, Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the 
bid performance of a small, medium, and large bidder finding that when 
bidding (1) the small bidder considered both project type and contract 
value, (2) the large bidder was more successful in bidding for large 
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contracts and, (3) the medium bidder's competitiveness was not related 
to either type or size. 
 
These three variables - project size, project type and bidder size - 
were also used in our work. 
 
 
MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Bidding performance concerns the relationship between bids submitted 
by different bidders in competition.  Although this relationship can 
be quantified in purely relative terms (Skitmore, 1986), the model and 
subsequent analysis is quite difficult and not easily treated by 
conventional means.  For most practical purposes it is sufficient to 
consider bids in relation to a baseline.  Common baselines include the 
designer's estimate, a bidder's cost estimate, or the mean, median or 
lowest of the bids entered for a contract.  In this case we use that 
latter measure as it is easily understood and also because it has been 
shown that, under certain restrictive conditions, the expected value 
of the winning bid "... is surely equal to the true value" of the 
project (see Milgrom, 1981, and  Wilson, 1979, for instance). 
 
A measure of competitiveness of this type commonly found in the 
literature is the percentage of each bid above the baseline, i.e., 
 
C = 100(x - x(1))/x(1) (1) 
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where C denotes the measure of competitiveness required, x represents 
the bid value entered by an individual bidder, and x(1) represents the 
value of the lowest bid entered for the contract.  From this it is 
clear that lower percentage values indicate greater competitiveness, 
the lowest bidder having a competitiveness value of zero percent. 
 
By aggregating the C values for an individual bidder over a series of 
auctions it is then possible to examine that bidders performance in 
terms of the frequency distribution of the aggregated C values.  In 
this study we consider two summary statistics describing the frequency 
distribution - the arithmetic mean, C', and standard deviation, C".  
Low values of C' are taken to denote high competitiveness and low 
values of C" are taken to denote a high level of consistency of 
competitiveness.  This latter interpretation needs to be treated with 
care for, as C values are constrained to be minimum at zero, C' and C" 
are not necessarily independent and greater values of C" are to be 
expected for greater values of C'.  The coefficient of variation is 
given by 
 
 CV = C"/{(C'/100)+1} (2) 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
A total of 2347 bids from 368 contracts bid for between 1978 to 1985 
were collected from a large quantity surveying practice in Hong Kong. 
 This represented general building work only.  Specialist work such as 
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piling and services was not included in the sample.  The data source 
was unwilling to make available more recent information due to reasons 
of confidentiality. 
 
In the initial screening all qualified bids were omitted from the data 
as they could not be directly compared with other bids.  Additionally 
all contracts where the total number and identity of bidders were not 
known were also omitted.  The reason being that this would distort the 
true competitiveness of the bidders being analysed as in these cases 
only the most competitive bids were recorded (usually the three lowest 
bids). 
 
From this sample 12 bidders were selected for analysis on the basis 
that they had submitted the most bids and were government approved.  
Each bidder was assigned a code to preserve identity and classified 
into size groupings according to Government criteria for contractor 
classification.  This categorises contractors into three project value 
bands.  Each band has an upper project value limit to which the 
contractor can bid, i.e. up to HK$6 million (small), up to HK$30 
million (medium), unlimited (large) (Hong Kong Government 1990).  The 
12 bidders selected comprised four large, four medium, and four small 
companies and were coded 1-4, 5-8, 9-12 respectively.  A total of 446 
bids received from the 12 bidders for 228 contracts were analysed.  
210 contracts were for private sector work, 18 contracts were for 
public sector work. 
 
For the building type analysis the projects were classified into broad 
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building type categories according to CI/Sfb classification (RIBA 
1976), viz., 
 
(1) Building Type 1 : Utilities, civil engineering facilities 
(2) Building Type 2 : Industrial facilities 
(3) Building Type 3 : Administrative, commercial, protective 
services facilities 
(4) Building Type 4 : Health, welfare facilities 
(5) Building Type 5 : Recreational facilities 
(6) Building Type 6 : Religious facilities 
(7) Building Type 7 : Education, scientific, information facilities 
(8) Building Type 8 : Residential facilities 
(9) Building Type 9 : Common facilities 
 
Broad categories were selected because there was insufficient data for 
specific building type categorisation. 
 
For comparison all contract values were updated to a common base date 
(February 1986) based on a local tender price index (Levett and 
Bailey, 1990).  On average, 10 bidders were invited to bid for each 
contract, one of which declined to bid leaving 9 recorded bids for 
each contract. 
 
Table 1 gives the contract bid statistics for each of the bidders.  
There is more data on the large bidders and as expected larger bidders 
have bid for, on average, larger contracts.  It is perhaps surprising 
to find, especially when economies of scale are considered, that all 
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the medium and large bidders in the sample have also bid for 
comparatively small contracts.  This it would seem lends weight to the 
argument that larger bidders are selected to bid on the basis of 
reputation as they are better known than the smaller bidders (This 
aspect is considered further later in this analysis). 
 
Table 1 also highlights the fact that classifying bidder size 
according to government criteria for what is essentially a sample of 
private sector work is not directly applicable and therefore can only 
be used as a crude measure of size.  For example although bidder 12, a 
'small bidder', is only eligible to bid for government work up to $6 
million, he has submitted a bid of over $84 million.  Likewise bidder 
8, a 'medium bidder' who is only eligible to bid for government work 
up to $30 million has submitted a bid of over $245 million.  Bidder 
12, a 'smaller bidder' also has an average contract bid larger than 
any of the medium bidders. 
 
In respect of the analysis by project type, Table 2 illustrates the 
bidding performance of all bidders according to building type.  Most 
bidding attempts were for building type 8, residential contracts, 
which would be expected.  With the exception of this and building 
types 6 and 9, which in this sample represented uncommon building 
types, the bidding attempts for the remaining building types were 
quite evenly distributed. 
 
Disregarding types 6 and 9 due to lack of data, Table 2 reveals that 
there is a significant correlation between the average competitiveness 
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percentage and average bid size of r = 0.934 (prob < 0.001).  
Contracts of a larger average bid therefore generate a smaller 
competitiveness percentage.  This may be partly due to the smaller 
differences in the competitiveness percentage per dollar change for 
larger contracts.  This in turn may be related to the size of 
contractor being invited for the size of project,  large contractors 
having been invited to bid for predominantly large contracts. 
 
19 outliers were recorded at the 2 standard deviations level (see 
Table 3).  With 3 exceptions all the outliers were for contracts under 
$11 million which is note worthy when the average bid size in the 
analysis was over $44 million.  This may be partly due to large and 
medium bidders not being so competitive on small contracts.  (This 
point is examined more closely later in the analysis).  The three 
exceptions were :- 
 
(1) a bid of $87,302,959 which was the largest bid submitted by 
bidder no.6, a 'medium' bidder. 
 
(2) a bid of $28,307,558 which was submitted by bidder no.10, a 
'small' bidder. 
 
(3) a bid of $48,657,656 which was submitted by bidder no.2, a 
'large' bidder.  This bid was for an unusual building type (a 
mosque). 
 
It is also interesting to note that 8 of the 19 outliers were for 
 17
 
 
building type 1 (utilities, civil engineering facilities).  This may 
be because this building type generated substancially smaller than 
average bids.  The average bid generated for this project type can be 
seen from Table 2 as being $14,400,564. 
 
The correlation between average competitiveness and its coefficient of 
variation was found to be significant (r=0.878, prob<0.05) which 
suggests that competitive bids were more consistent than other bids. 
 
The number of times that a bidder declined to bid was also considered. 
 Large bidders, who declined to bid on 35 occasions, exercised the 
option in declining to bid substantially more than either the medium 
or small bidders.  These groups of contractors declined to bid on only 
3 and 2 occasions respectively.  Bidder 3, who declined to bid on 20 
occasions, appears to adopt a selective bidding strategy. 
 
Bidder analysis 
 
The bidders were initially analysed according to classification (ie., 
small, medium and large bidders) for all project types and then 
according to each building type.  Subsequently each bidder's 
performance was analysed for all project types and then according to 
each building type. 
 
Bidding performance according to bidder classification 
 
Inspection of Table 4 reveals there is a trend which points towards 
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the larger bidders achieving a lower average competitiveness 
percentage.  This may be for reasons previously described (see 
comments under Table 2).  However, the bidding attempt/lowest bid 
ratio increases with the smaller bidders.  This may be caused by small 
bidders displaying a higher bid variability, which in turn may be 
partly attributable to smaller contracts giving rise to greater 
differences in the competitiveness percentage as the percentage 
difference are greater per dollar change from the lowest bid received. 
 
Classifying the bidders into large, medium and small based on 
Government criteria (Table 4) produced the statistics of F(2) = 2.65 
(prob=0.072) and Cochran's C = 0.48 (prob=0.000).  A sensitivity 
analysis was carried out on this method of grouping.  The grouping was 
rescheduled by average recorded contract bid (large = bidders coded 1, 
2, 3, 4; medium = bidders coded 6, 7, 8, 12; small = bidders coded 7, 
9, 10, 11).  This new grouping produced average competitiveness 
percentages and variances of 16.60 (479.18), 21.22 (435.56) and 22.21 
(872.61) for large, medium and small bidders respectively (F(2)=2.60, 
prob=0.075; Cochran's C=0.49, prob=0.000).  Bidders were further 
rescheduled by average contract bid recorded into two size categories 
- large and small (large = bidders coded 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12; small = 5, 
6, 7, 9, 10, 11), producing an average competitiveness percentage and 
variance of 16.58 (441.42) and 23.19 (698.02) respectively (F(1)=8.57, 
prob=0.004; Cochran's C=0.61, prob=0.001).  The results of these 
analyses suggest that larger contractors are more competitive and less 
variable than smaller contractors irrespective of the particular 
method of classifying contractor size. 
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When the bidder performance according to bidder classification for 
each building type was analysed it was found that large bidders 
achieved the highest average competitive percentage (34.28%) and 
variance (2947.19) for building type 1, the project type with the 
smallest average contract bid ($14.40 million).  Likewise for small 
bidders the highest average competitive percentage (32.04%) and 
variance (3329.63) is for building type 3, the project type with the 
highest average contract bid ($72.49 million).  This observation 
offers some evidence that in terms of competitiveness there is some 
relationship between bidder size and contract value.  (Later in the 
analysis this aspect is considered further). 
 
When analysing the variability of bidding between contract types it 
was found that large, medium and small bidding achieved a variability 
of 957 110, 204 662, 1 032 538 respectively.  The suspected reason for 
large bidders having a high variability between types is that they 
have been invited to bid for smaller contracts on which they are 
generally less competitive and in addition achieve a higher 
variability.  Smaller bidders, however, due to their limited resources 
have generally been invited to only bid on smaller contracts.  It is 
hypothesized that if the bids for larger bidders on large contracts 
were considered similarly as the bids of the smaller bidders who have 
generally only bid on smaller contracts, the variance between project 
types for the larger bidders would be substantially reduced. 
 
Bidding performance according to bidder 
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Each bidders bidding performance was subsequently analysed (see Table 
5). 
 
In this analysis it is contended that the bidders who are judged to be 
better performers are those who are able to attain a lower average 
competitiveness percentage and also achieve a lower bid variability. 
 
The bidders that best satisfy this criterion are bidders coded 1, 3, 5 
and 9.  With respect to bidder 1, although he has been a good 
performer he has unfortunately achieved one of the smaller bidding 
attempts/lowest bid ratios.  This is probably because of his 
comparatively low variance.  Bidder 3, with one outlier omitted, has 
achieved both the lowest average competitiveness percentage and 
variance.  This may be a reflection on the fact that this bidder 
adopts a selective strategy.  Bidder 5's bidding performance is also 
impressive particularly as this bidder has attained a bidding 
attempt/lowest bid ratio of 0.25.  However, it should be noted that 
his 36 bidding attempts produced 3 outliers.  Finally, bidder 9 is 
also a good performer, however, this may be due to the fact that this 
bidder has submitted a comparatively small range of bids (see Table 
1). 
 
The worst performers overall in terms of average competitiveness and 
bid variability are bidders coded 4, 6 and 11 (outliers omitted). 
 
Bidder 4 also has the lowest bidding attempt/lowest bid ratio and 
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being a large bidder possibly relies on his reputation to obtain work. 
 (The low ratio is probably attributable to the bidder having a 
comparatively high average competitiveness percentage, but 
proportionally not so high variance).  Although the average 
competitiveness percentage is comparatively high for bidders 6 and 11, 
they have still managed to attain reasonable bidding attempt/lowest 
bid ratio which probably is a reflection on their comparatively high 
bidding variability. 
 
The competitiveness percentage was compared with the variance to 
determine if there was any correlation between these two variables 
(see Table 6).  The outliers were not omitted to reflect the 'raw' 
performance of the bidder.  This produced a correlation coefficient of 
r = 0.760 (df=11, prob <0.01).  There is therefore, a strong 
correlation between competitive percentage and variance.  Bidder no. 3 
is the exception to the trend.  His performance has been adversely 
affected by the presence of one outlier (see Table 1 and Table 4).  If 
this one outlier is omitted from the analysis bidder 3's variance and 
average competitiveness percentage 98.8 and 10.72 respectively.  This 
gives an overall improved correlation coefficient rating of r = 0.856 
(df=11, prob <0.001). 
 
The correlation of a larger competitive percentage attracting a larger 
variance would seem a logical outcome as a bidder with a high average 
competitiveness percentage but low variance would fail to get any 
work.  Conversely a bidder with a lower average competitiveness 
percentage but high variability would eventually become bankrupt. 
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The correlation of average competitiveness with the coefficient of 
variation was significant (r=0.683, prob<0.05).  With one outlier 
removed, the correlation was still significant (r=0.661, prob<0.05).  
This again suggests that consistency increases with competitiveness. 
 
The comparison of variance with the bid attempt/lowest bid ratio 
produced a correlation coefficient of r = 0.424 (df=11, prob>0.05) 
which indicates there is insufficient evidence of correlation between 
bidders with a larger variance also having a larger bid attempt/lowest 
bid ratio.  The two exceptions to this trend are bidders coded 4 and 
9.  (Possible reasons for these exceptions are because bidder 4, a 
large bidder relies on reputation, bidder 9 has submitted a 
comparatively small range of bids). 
 
Likewise the comparison of competitiveness with the bid attempt/lowest 
bid ratio produced a correlation coefficient of r = 0.149 (df=6, 
prob>0.05).  There is therefore no evidence of correlation between 
bidders with a larger average competitiveness percentage also having a 
larger bid attempt/lowest bid ratio.  The reason for the low 
correlation may be because of bidders 3, 4 and 9 whose performances 
conflict with the expected trend. 
 
For the sake of brevity, Table 7 illustrates the bidding performance 
of each of the bidders according to building types 1, 3 and 7 only.  
(The bidding attempt/lowest bid ratio has not been calculated as the 
number of bidding attempts are too widely dispersed to give a 
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meaningful result). 
 
The importance of omitting outliers should be noted especially as the 
number of bidding attempts on each building type by most bidder is 
small.  For example consider bidder 3's bidding performance on 
building type 1.  Bidder no. 3 had four bidding attempts on this type 
of project, one of which achieved a competitiveness percentage of 211% 
above the lowest bid (see outlier analysis).  If this is treated as an 
outlier and omitted the remaining bids show the bidder to be very 
competitive for this building type.  Therefore in assessing bidding 
performance outliers need to be considered. 
 
In addition to the outliers the number of bidding attempts also needs 
to be considered as the fewer the bidding attempts on a project type 
the less certainty there is of a bidders performance.  For example 
consider bidder no.11's bidding performance on building type no.3.  
Bidder no. 11 submitted two bids; one in which he was the lowest 
bidder and another in which he was 147% above the lowest bid (see 
outlier analysis).  The bidding performance of bidders with a small 
number of bidding attempts for a particular type should therefore be 
viewed with caution. 
 
Taking the above into consideration it is suggested that the bidders 
with the better bidding performance in terms of competitiveness and 
bid variability for particular building types are denoted with an 
asterisk. 
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For building type 7 there would appear to be no outstanding performer. 
 However, a possible contender may be bidder no. 5 who succeeded in 
becoming the lowest bidder on four occasions from eleven bidding 
attempts, although this is probably attributable to his comparatively 
high bid variability. 
 
Although there appears to be some affinity by certain bidders towards 
particular building types there is little evidence of bidders having a 
strong preference in terms of competitiveness for a particular 
building type.  For example the strongest type preference was for 
building type 7 in which bidder 5 was the lowest bidder on 4 occasions 
out of 11 bidding attempts. 
 
Domination by certain bidders in terms of competitiveness for a 
building type in the private sector is not as strong as that shown in 
previous research for public sector work (Flanagan and Norman, 1982b: 
Drew and Skitmore, 1990).  Possible reasons for this include that :- 
 
(1) the private sector contracts are for a variety of clients as 
opposed to one client. 
 
(2) the design and specification of the private sector contracts are 
likely to be more diversified than that of government contracts. 
 
(3) the method of bidding for the private sector contracts is 
selective in which the bidders are invited, as opposed to open 
bidding as practised by Hong Kong Government where the onus is 
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on the bidder to enter into competition. 
 
(4) unlike the usual practice adopted by government, contracts in 
the private sector the contract may not be awarded to the lowest 
bidder. 
 
(5) the project types for this sample are more broadly based when 
compared with the previous research (Flanagan and Norman, 1982b: 
Drew and Skitmore, 1990) which focused on a few specific 
building types. 
 
(6) in constructing the bid list little emphasis may have been 
placed on bidders having preferences for particular building 
types. 
 
Regression analysis and bidder size 
 
Regression analysis was used as an aid to determine the bidding 
performance.  The bid values of past bidding attempts were plotted 
against the competitiveness percentage (the dependent variable) and 
contract value.  Regression analysis was used to determine the line of 
best fit.  Assuming the regression line represents a bidders true 
competitiveness/contract size relationship, then he is clearly most 
competitive where the regression line is closest to the X axis, i.e.  
at the trough of the regression line.  The corresponding contract 
value at this point represents the bidder's preferred value (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 2 illustrates the bidding performance in terms of 
competitiveness for each of the bidders coded 1 to 12.  Each bidder's 
competitiveness according to contract value is represented by the 
quadratic regression curve referred to in Figure 1.  This has been 
fitted to the recorded data values for each of the 12 bidders 
encircled.  Bold lines indicate the fit within the recorded data 
values and dashed lines show the curve extrapolated outside the data 
values. 
 
As may be seen from Figure 2, 9 out of the 12 bidders display a 
concave curve which indicates a preferred value.  The exceptions who 
display a convex curve are bidders 7, 9 and 10.  A convex curve may be 
due to the existence of any one or a combination of the following :- 
 
(1) two or more preferred size ranges. 
(2) weak or no preferred size range. 
(3) confounding effects of other preferences e.g. location. 
(4) 'noise' effects caused by random fluctuations in bidding. 
(5) sampling effects, e.g. lack of data, spurious data, and 
outliers.   
Only two regression curves are significant at the 5% level (F Test).  
This is probably attributable to the high variability in bidding.  In 
respect of the large bidders (bidders 1-4), the graph illustrates that 
the preferred value is for larger contracts and that they are not so 
competitive on the smaller contracts.  This accords with previous 
findings (Flanagan and Norman 1982b: Drew and Skitmore 1990). 
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For the medium bidders (bidders 5-8) only bidders 5 and 6 display a 
preferred value.  Bidder 8 has what would appear to be a very weak 
preferred value.  This is probably a reflection on the fact that for a 
medium bidder, this bidder has submitted comparatively large bids. 
 
For the smaller bidders (bidders 9-12) only bidder 12 clearly displays 
a preferred value.  This may be because this bidder has submitted 
comparatively large bids for a small bidder.  Bidder 11 displays a 
negative preferred value which is possibly due this bidders extremely 
high variability in bidding. 
 
If the convex regression lines are regarded as spurious then there is 
evidence to suggest that the medium and small bidders when compared to 
the larger bidders are more competitive on the smaller contracts.  In 
terms of competitiveness therefore there would appear to be a 
relationship between bidder size and contract value in which larger 
bidders are more competitive for larger contracts and vice versa. 
 
The regression analysis was repeated for building type 8 (residential 
buildings).  10 out of 11 bidders display a concave curve indicating a 
preferred value (see Figure 3). 
 
Regression analysis and coefficient for the x squared term 
 
In our earlier work (Drew and Skitmore, 1990) it was hypothesized that 
'in respect of size of contractor, due to the influence of resource 
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constraints, smaller contractors should have smaller preferred size 
ranges than large contractors and therefore larger coefficients for 
the x squared term'.  However, it was concluded that 'there is no 
evidence ...  that larger contractors are more competitive over a 
wider range of contract sizes than small contractors'. 
 
This hypothesis was repeated with the current data, initially 
according to bidder classification in which it was found that large, 
medium and small contractors achieved coefficients for the x squared 
term of -2.20720 E-07, -2.46549 E-07, -5.92301 E-07 respectively. 
 
The three sets of bidders therefore display preferred contract ranges 
(this can be seen from the negative values of the coefficient for the 
x squared term which gives a concave regression curve).  In addition 
there is a trend which points to smaller bidders producing a larger 
coefficient for the x squared term. 
 
In respect of individual bidders, nine out of twelve bidders have 
preferred contract values (due to the negative coefficient), whereas 
the three remaining bidders display a convex curve (as can be seen by 
the positive coefficient - see also Figure 2). 
 
If the convex curves are treated as being spurious, then there is 
evidence to suggest that small and medium bidders, at least, are 
likely to have larger coefficient for the x squared term than large 
bidders.  (It is suspected that bidder 8, a medium bidder, has a 
coefficient smaller than any of the large bidders is due to the fact 
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that he has bid over a comparatively wide range of contracts (see 
Table 1)). 
 
Although there appears to be some evidence to support the hypothesis, 
the results should be considered in the light that the data is based 
on selective tendering.  The ability therefore of entering into the 
competition rests with the consultant selecting the bidder and not 
with the bidder entering into the competition on his own initiative 
(as is the case with open tendering).  The bidder therefore has no 
control over the size of contract he bids for (unless he declines to 
bid) - this is left in the hands of the consultant.  For this reason 
the coefficients are unlikely to reflect a bidder's true 
competitiveness value range. 
 
 
 
Success and bidder size 
 
The notion that larger bidders succeed in winning contracts on the 
basis of reputation was investigated. 
 
It has already been demonstrated that the bidding attempt/lowest bid 
ratio increases with smaller bidders (see Table 4).  This is based on 
information contained in bid reports for 228 contracts.  However, this 
cannot be used as a basis for determining the winning bidder as this 
is not known at the time the bid report is written.  Therefore the 
contract bills were sought for these contracts of which 111 contract 
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bills were found.  By comparing the bidding attempt/lowest bid ratio 
based on bid reports (see Table 4) with that based on contract bills 
(see Table 9) it can be seen that the ratios are almost identical.  
Therefore the 111 contracts based on contract bills would appear to be 
a fair representative sample of the 228 contracts based on bid 
reports. 
 
As both the lowest bidder and successful bidder are known for the 
contracts based on contract bills it is possible to calculate both the 
bidding attempt/lowest bid ratio and bidding attempt/successful bidder 
ratio as shown in Table 9. 
 
Although the bidding attempt/lowest bid ratio increases with the 
smaller bidders it can be seen that the group of large bidders enjoy 
the highest success/lowest bid ratio.  It would seem, therefore, 
although the smaller bidders have the greatest chance of becoming the 
lowest bidder, large bidders have the greatest chance of winning the 
contract which supports the notion that bidders succeed in winning 
contracts on the basis of reputation. 
 
Bidder 2 (a large bidder) was the most favoured bidder in this respect 
because although he was the lowest bidder on two occasions he was 
successful on six occasions.  Bidder 6 (a medium bidder) however, 
submitted 24 bids and was the lowest bidder on two occasions, yet 
failed to secure a contract. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results indicate that in terms of competitiveness there is a 
relationship between bidder size and contract value.  Large bidders 
seem to be more competitive on large contracts.  This is in accord 
with Flanagan and Norman's (1982b) contention.  In addition there is 
evidence to suggest that medium and small bidders are more competitive 
on smaller contracts. 
 
Contracts of a larger value generate a smaller average competitive 
percentage.  A contributing factor is that for larger contracts there 
is a smaller percentage difference per dollar change from the lowest 
bid received.  This phenomena gives rise to larger bidders generally 
achieving a lower average competitiveness percentage as they bid for, 
on average, larger contracts.  As competitiveness is the dependent 
variable smaller contracts are therefore likely to generate a larger 
number of outliers. 
 
This finding also has repercussions on the bidding consistency of 
bidders in that smaller bidders are likely to display a higher bidding 
variance.  This higher variability may be exacerbated as smaller 
bidders are likely to display a greater competitive variability than 
large bidders due to a combination of reasons which include resource 
constraints coupled with the fact that there is a greater variety of 
potential competitors. 
 
The variability relationship between different size of bidders also 
 32
 
 
has an effect on the bidding attempt/lowest bid ratio.  Smaller 
bidders are likely to achieve a larger bidding attempt/lowest bid 
ratio. 
 
There is a strong correlation between competitiveness and variability. 
 A higher average competitiveness percentage gives rise to higher 
variance/standard deviation/coefficient of variation.  There is, 
however, insufficient evidence of correlation between variance and 
bidding attempt lowest bid ratio.   
 
There are, however, grounds to show that although smaller bidders 
achieve a higher bid attempt/lowest bid ratio, large bidders at least 
achieve a higher bid attempt/success ratio. 
 
A selective bidding strategy is likely to achieve a lower average 
competitiveness percentage and variance. 
 
There is evidence that in terms of competitiveness bidders have 
preferred value ranges.  In addition there is some evidence, at least, 
that larger bidders have a wider preferred value range and are more 
competitive over a wider value range.  This was judged by the fact 
smaller bidders display a larger coefficient for the x squared term.  
However, due to the procedures of selective tendering the ability of 
entering into competition rests with the consultant, not with the 
bidder.  Therefore the coefficient of the x squared term is unlikely 
to be a true reflection of a bidders true competitive value range.  
There is no evidence to show that certain bidders display strong 
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affinities in terms of competitiveness towards particular project 
types for private sector work as has been shown for public sector work 
(Flanagan and Norman, 1982b; Drew and Skitmore, 1990). 
 
The analysis is also inconclusive in proving that smaller bidders are 
more variable in their competitiveness between certain types.  The 
suspected reason is that the larger bidders have been invited to bid 
on smaller contracts on which they are less competitive.  This when 
combined with the larger contracts on which they are more competitive 
compounds the larger bidders bidding variability. 
 
Using government criteria as a means to classifying bidder size for 
private sector work does have limitations.  However, this measure has 
shown that bidders classified as large, medium and small have 
generally submitted bids appropriate to their size.  Sensitivity 
analysis by alternative sizing criteria provided similar results.  The 
larger bidders have also been invited and submitted bids on 
comparatively small contracts.  This may be linked to the fact that 
larger bidders are preferred to smaller bidders as witnessed by the 
high bid attempt success ratio. 
 
In conclusion, it is our firm view that in constructing bid lists 
consultants should ensure that :- 
 
(1) the size of bidder is appropriate to the contract value. 
 
(2) in terms of competitiveness bidders preferences such as type are 
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considered. 
 
(3) bidders have recent experience in constructing projects of a 
similar type and contract value. 
 
(4) once selected all bidders should be considered as equal 
competitors (subject to qualified bids and the technical check). 
 
One of the benefits of carefully constructing a bid list is that fewer 
bidders can be invited to bid without adverse effect to the likely bid 
values received.  In addition, by consistently choosing bidders who 
are likely to submit competitive bids, on average, lower bids are 
likely to be received thereby giving the client better value for 
money. 
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Table 1: Bids received 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Average 
    Bidder Bidder   contract   Minimum  Maximum 
classification  code     bid  bid value  
bid value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    Large   1  33,295,513  1,669,076
 134,926,307 
  2 105,816,074    357,006 440,707,600 
  3 102,042,336  2,747,598 428,183,871 
  4  50,025,160  3,679,345 440,010,757 
 
    Medium   5   7,624,180     55,865  
59,369,510 
  6  15,521,911    408,863  87,302,959 
  7  14,544,635    271,942  62,597,101 
  8  27,968,786    279,051 245,569,448 
 
    Small   9   1,724,441     76,562   
5,682,676 
 10  13,385,729    167,247  53,789,680 
 11   9,947,344       189,225  63,669,522 
 12  32,812,372  2,471,828  84,633,017 
 
    Overall   44,052,087     55,865
 440,707,600 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 2: Bidder performance according to building type for all bidders 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
--------Building  Average No of   AverageCoefficient 
type     bid bidding competitiveness
 Variance     of 
   value attempts     value   variation 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 1  14,400,564  64     32.81  1551.23   
29.66 
 2  38,537,646  47     14.16   202.40   
12.46 
 3  72,487,719  51     14.02   480.54   
19.23 
 4  46,219,382  49     17.24   251.02   
13.51 
 5  22,095,237  38     16.90   359.03   
16.21 
(6) (19,945,541)   (7)    (20.13)
  (528.40)   (19.14) 
 7  18,319,841   64     20.47   403.41      16.67 
 8  70,972,613 124     16.27   302.88   
14.97 
(9)    (195,210)   (2)    (67.05)
 (3192.01)   (33.82)  
 
Overall  44,052,087 446     19.21   552.77   
19.72  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bracketed figures denote project types with small number of bidding attempts 
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Table 3: Outliers 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Record Bidder Building       Bid Competitiveness  
  no  code   type      value    percentage 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 57    2   1      729,737       77 
 77    2   6   48,657,656       65 
116    3   1    4,994,431      211 
171    4   1    3,786,331      136 
172    4   1    5,162,195       90 
216    5   9      111,370      107 
231    5   1    2,868,587       79 
235    5   5    4,743,667       73 
255    6   1    1,803,379      115 
263    6   7    5,606,200       87 
274    6   8    7,922,436       71 
289    6   8   87,302,959       67 
311    7   5   10,727,010       90 
382   11   1    1,882,222      131 
384   11   3      189,225      147 
385   10   4    1,543,500       83 
403   10   7    9,957,858       87 
407   10   8   28,307,558      107 
424   12   1   10,182,964       93 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 4: Bidding performance according to bidder classification for all 
building types 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bidder  No of    No of  Bidding  Average  Coeff. 
class  bidding  occasions  attempt/   compet. Variance   of 
 attempts    lowest lowest bid  percentage   varn. 
    bid    ratio 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Large    214    17    0.079  16.60  479.18  18.77 
Medium   153    20    0.131  21.15  471.98  17.93 
Small     79    14    0.177  22.53  888.11  24.32 
 
Overall    446    51    0.114  19.21  552.77
  19.72 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 5: Bidding performance according to bidders for all building types 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bidder  No of    No of  Bidding  Average  Coeff. 
class  bidding  occasions  attempt/   compet. Variance   of 
 attempts    lowest lowest bid  percentage   varn. 
    bid    ratio 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All types 
 
1    55   3  0.055    12.96    117.55   9.60 
2    59   5  0.085        14.05    256.87  14.05 
  (57)  -   -   (12.05)   (144.33) (10.72) 
3    55   7  0.127        14.36    826.28  25.14 
  (54)  -   -   (10.72)    (98.80)  (8.98) 
4    45   2  0.044    27.14    677.64  20.47 
  (43)  -   -       (23.13)   (316.05) (14.44) 
5    36   9  0.250        19.87    661.78  21.46 
  (33)  -   -        (13.85)   (254.53) (14.01) 
6    39   5  0.128        32.38    690.25  19.85 
  (35)  -   -        (26.34)   (365.01) (15.12) 
7    44   4  0.091        17.08    237.59  13.17 
  (43)  -   -       (15.39)   (114.76)  (9.28) 
8    34   2  0.059        14.92    154.83  10.83 
9    13   3  0.231        11.23    159.60  11.36 
10    26   5  0.192        23.01    903.16  24.43 
  (23)  -   -       (13.98)   (271.20) (14.45) 
11    20   4  0.200        32.61   1591.53  30.08 
  (18)  -   -       (20.79)   (291.75) (14.14) 
12    20   2  0.100        19.17    558.62  19.83 
  (19)  -   -       (15.27)   (267.45) (14.19) 
 
Overall   446  51  0.114     19.21    
552.77  19.72  
 (427)  -   -     (15.58)   (213.30) (12.64) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bracketed figures denote bidding performance with outliers omitted. 
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Table 6: Competitiveness percentages v bid attempts lowest bid ratio 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Bidder Bidding attempt/   Average  Coeff. 
code   lowest bid competitiveness Variance   of 
     ratio   percentage   varn. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  9    0.231    11.23  159.60 11.36 
  1    0.055    12.96  117.55  9.60 
  2    0.085    14.05  256.87 14.05 
  3    0.127    14.36  826.28 25.14 
  8    0.059    14.92  154.83 10.83 
  7    0.091    17.08  237.59 13.17 
 12    0.100    19.17  558.62 19.83 
  5    0.250    19.87  661.78 21.46 
 10    0.192    23.01  903.16 24.43 
  4    0.044    27.14  677.64 20.47 
  6    0.128    32.38  690.25 19.85 
 11    0.200    32.61  1591.93 30.08 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 7: Bidding performance according to bidders for each building type 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bidder   No of    No of  Average  Coeff. 
class  bidding  occasions  compet. Variance   of 
 attempts    lowest  percentage   varn. 
    bid 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Building Type 1 
* 1   6 0   6.49    14.86   3.62 
  2   3 0  51.27   722.32  17.77 
 (2) - (38.45)  (459.05) (15.48) 
* 3   4 1  54.51 10887.59  67.53 
 (3) -  (2.34)    (4.26)  (2.02) 
  4   8 0  28.63  2496.55  38.84 
 (6) - (13.77)  (321.44) (15.76) 
  5   4 0  31.32  1104.62  25.31 
 (3) - (15.60)  (173.12) (11.38) 
  6  11 1  36.32   411.45  14.88 
  7   3 0  13.56    19.66   3.90 
  8   3 0  20.10     7.00   2.20 
  9   2 1  16.45   541.20  19.98 
 10   2 1   3.45    23.74   4.71 
 11   6 0  54.45  1579.24  25.73 
 (5) - (39.14)  (238.57) (11.10) 
 12  11 1  24.77   843.71  23.28 
(10) - (17.91)  (361.19) (16.12) 
Building Type 3 
  1   9 1  10.04    86.70   8.46 
* 2   8 2   4.25    18.59   4.14 
  3  10 0  10.05    43.96   6.02 
  4   9 1  18.96   316.21  14.95 
  5   0 -    -      -   - 
  6   2 0  19.35    15.13   3.26 
  7   6 1  12.43    62.17   7.01 
  8   1 0  13.08      -   - 
  9   1 1   0.00      -   - 
 10   1 0  33.50      -   - 
 11   2 1  73.50 10804.50  59.91 
 (1) -  (0.00)      -   - 
 12   2 0   5.87     7.37   2.56 
Building Type 7 
  1  10 1  15.99   310.27  15.19 
  2   5 0  26.39   201.59  11.23 
  3   5 0  21.31   117.83   8.95 
  4   4 0  25.08   145.10   9.63 
  5  11 4  17.43   482.70  18.71 
  6   7 1  36.78   968.25  22.75 
 (6) - (28.41)  (573.80) (18.65) 
  7   6 0  15.80    15.55   3.41 
  8   0 -    -      -   - 
  9   6 1  11.03   125.31  10.08 
 10   5 2  21.27  1386.50  30.70 
 (4) -   (4.84)   (48.71)  (6.66) 
 11   3 1   9.46    89.30   8.63 
 12   2 0  32.85    61.60   5.91 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bracketed figures denote bidding performance with outliers omitted 
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Bidders with an asterisk denote good performers for that particular building type 
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Table 8: Regression coefficients according to bidders 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Bidder code   Bidder class     Coefficient 
----------------------------------------------------------  
      8     medium    -6.55883 E-08 
      4     large    -4.86991 E-07 
     (7)    (medium)   (+3.99297 E-07) 
    (10)    (small)   (+3.12742 E-07) 
      1      large    -2.76154 E-07 
      2      large     -2.13083 E-07 
      3     large    -2.04388 E-07 
     (9)    (small)    +5.04080 E-07 
     11     small    -4.00982 E-07 
      6     medium    -2.03396 E-06 
      5      medium    -1.04384 E-06 
     12     small    -1.00555 E-06 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Bracketed figures denote bidders with convex curves 
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Table 9: Success and lowest bidder according to classification 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bidder  No. of bidding  No of   Bidding    No of Bidding 
class     attempts occasions  attempts  occasions attempts/ 
 lowest  lowest bid  successful success 
  bid    ratio    ratio 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Large       104    9     0.086     16   0.153 
Medium        76   10     0.132      7   0.092 
Small        43    8     0.186      6   0.140 
 
Overall       223   27     0.121     29   0.130 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 47 
 
 
CAPTIONS FOR FIGURES 
 
Figure Caption 
 
  1 Competitiveness, according to project value, of a hypothetical 
contractor 
 
  2 Competitiveness, according to project value, of twelve bidders for 
all projects in sample 
 
3 Competitiveness, according to project value, of twelve bidders for 
building type 8 - residential facilities 
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